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IMPLEMENTATION WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION IN 
EXCHANGE ECONOMIES 
BY THOMAS R. PALFREY AND SANJAY SRIVASTAVA1 
In this paper, we analyze the problem of designing incentive compatible mechanisms in 
pure exchange economic environments when agents have incomplete information. The 
equilibrium concept employed is Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the notion of implementa-
tion is full implementation, which is stronger than the more commonly employed notion of 
truthful implementation. 
An allocation rule is truthfully implementable if there exists a dii-ect mechanism to 
which truth telling is an equilibrium and which yields the allocation rule as its truthful 
equilibrium outcome. An allocation rule is fully implementable if there exists a mechanism 
which yields the allocation rule as its unique equilibrium outcome. More generally, a set of 
allocation rules, or a social choice set, is fully implementable if there exists a mechanism 
whose equilibrium outcomes coincide with the set. This stronger notion of implementation 
avoids the well known problems of multiple equilibria which arise in direct revelation 
games. 
We develop a condition, termed Bayesian monotonicity, which we show is necessary for 
full implementation. An incentive compatibility condition is also necessary. We prove that 
Bayesian monotonicity and a slightly stronger incentive compatibility condition are suffi-
cient for full implementation when there are at least three agents. 
We present several examples of allocation rules which do and do not satisfy our 
condition. One example is that of an allocation rule which is fully implementable by an 
indirect mechanism, but for which every equivalent direct mechanism has multiple equi-
librium outcomes. 
KEYWORDS: Implementation, incomplete information, noncooperative games, incentive 
compatibility, general equilibrium. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
MOST RESEARCH ON THE DESIGN of incentive compatible mechanisms in econo-
mies with incomplete information relies on the revelation principle (see, e.g., 
Myerson (1979), Harris and Townsend (1981)). The principle states that if an 
allocation rule is a Bayesian equilibrium outcome to some mechanism, then there 
is an equivalent direct mechanism to which truth telling is an equilibrium and 
whose truthful equilibrium yields the same outcome. In this case, the direct 
mechanism is said to truthfully implement the allocation rule (Dasgupta, 
Hammond, and Maskin (1979)). The revelation principle has frequently been 
invoked to argue that in designing incentive compatible mechanisms, no loss of 
generality is incurred by restricting attention to direct mechanisms. 
In this paper, we study the problem of designing incentive compatible mecha-
nisms using a notion of implementation stronger than truthful implementation. 
In particular, an allocation rule is said to be fully implementable (Dasgupta, 
Hammond, and Maskin (1979)) if there exists a mechanism which yields the 
1We thank Andrew Postlewaite, participants of the NBER/CEME/NSF Conference on General 
Equilibrium Theory, Cambridge, May 1985, and the Northwestern University 1985 Summer Workshop 
on Strategic Behavior and Competition, for their feedback on earlier versions of this work. We also 
thank David Kreps and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions which have greatly improved 
the paper. 
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allocation rule as its unique equilibrium outcome. More generally, a set of 
allocation rules, or a social choice set (SCS), is fully implementable if there exists 
a mechanism whose equilibrium outcomes coincide with the SCS. 
The primary reason for examining the implications of this stronger notion of 
implementation is that it avoids well-known problems associated with multiple 
equilibria. For instance, it is possible to construct examples in which an indirect 
mechanism has a unique equilibrium outcome but for which every equivalent 
direct mechanism has more than one equilibrium outcome (see Postlewaite and 
Schmeidler (1986) and Dasgupta, Hammond, and Mas.kin (1979)). A second type 
of problem arises when an indirect mechanism has multiple equilibrium out-
comes; application of the revelation principle requires the construction of a 
different direct mechanism for each outcome of the original mechanism. 
Third, many direct mechanisms studied in the literature have multiple equi-
librium outcomes (e.g. Milgrom (1981), Demski and Sappington (1984), and Rob 
(1984)), and the question arises whether indirect mechanisms can eliminate some 
of these equilibria. 
The problem of full implementation has been studied extensively when agents 
have complete information. Mas.kin (1977) identified a condition on SCS's called 
monotonicity, which is necessary for full implementation in Nash equilibrium, 
and, in economic environments, is sufficient if there are at least three agents. This 
paper provides a general characterization of (Bayesian Nash) fully implementable 
allocation rules in pure exchange economic settings where individual agents have 
incomplete and asymmetric information. We show that a condition, termed 
Bayesian monotonicity, is necessary for implementation as is an incentive compa-
tibility condition. We also show that when there are at least three agents, this 
condition and a slightly stronger incentive compatibility condition are sufficient 
to fully implement an allocation rule. The Bayesian monotonicity condition 
reduces to Mas.kin's familiar monotonicity condition when there is complete 
information. 
Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) have studied this problem for the special 
case when an informational restriction, called nonexclusivity of information, is 
imposed. This restriction requires that with I agents, every group of I - 1 agents 
collectively has complete information. They establish that a version of mono-
tonicity is necessary for implementation, and that a second, stronger monotonic-
ity condition is sufficient with three or more agents. While this result is an 
important first step, their informational restriction excludes many models of 
interest, such as those commonly employed to study auctions (e.g. Myerson 
(1981)), public goods provision (e.g. Laffont and Mas.kin (1982)), models of 
optimal trading mechanisms with incomplete information (e.g. Myerson and 
Satterthwaite (1983)), delegation games (e.g. Kalai and Samet (1986)), and 
partnership arrangements (e.g. Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987)). In 
these models and in most others, agents have exclusively private information. 
Our characterization goes beyond that of Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) in 
two important ways. First, we allow for very general information structures, 
ranging from exclusively private information to complete information. As such, it 
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contains as special cases previously known results about Nash and Bayesian 
Nash implementation in economic environments, and, in addition, our results 
cover the important set of problems listed above. Second, we do not impose a 
stronger version of monotonicity in proving sufficiency, so our results are not 
only broader in scope but provide a tighter characterization. 
2. THE MODEL AND DEFINITION 
The set of economic states (or environments) is denoted by a finite set, S, 
S = {1, 2, ... , S }. Each s ES describes the set of agents, their endowments, and 
their preferences. Following Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), we assume that 
the number of agents and the aggregate endowment are independent of the state. 
This assumption implies that the feasible set is independent of the state and is in 
keeping with most studies of implementation in Nash equilibrium in games of 
complete information. We denote by I the number of agents and by w the 
aggregate endowment in any state, w E ~L, w.,.. 0, where ~ is the real line. Note 
that these assumptions allow individual endowments to vary across states. 
Ui: ~£x S--+ ~ is the utility function of agent i in state s, and is assumed to 
be strictly increasing and bounded below for each s. Let 
X= {x:S--+A} 
be the set of all feasible allocation rules. Note that 0 EA, so that it is feasible to 
destroy the social endowment. A Social Choice Set (SCS), denoted F, is a subset 
of X. 
An agent's information is represented by a partition IIi of S. Elements of II; 
are called events, and each event E; E IIi is a maximal set of states that agent i 
cannot distinguish. In particular, if the state is s, we assume that agent i knows 
only that the true state lies in a set Ei(s) c S. Each agent also has a prior 
distribution over states, denoted by qi, and we assume that qi(s).,.. 0 for all i, s. 
Complete information is the special case E i( s) = { s } for all i and s. Let 
II= { II1, II1, ... , II1}. 
We assume that the partitions, the priors, the set of utility functions, and the 
aggregate endowment are all common knowledge. Given x E X and an event 
Ei(s), agent i evaluates the expected utility of xi after updating his prior 
probability on states using Bayes rule. The posterior probability is given by 
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The interim expected utility of allocation x to agent i at state s is 
.E<I (tlEi(s))ui(xi(t),t). 
tE E;(s) 
We can now define an interim preference relation on X, Ri, by 
xRi(Ei(s))y ifandonlyif 
_Eq; (tlEi(s))ui(xi(t), t);:::: _Eq; (tlEi(s))ui(yi(t),t). 
Let Pi(Ei(s)) denote the strict preference relation derived from Ri(Ei(s)). 
ASSUMPTION 1: For alls ES, n;Ei(s) = {s}. 
This assumption, made with essentially no loss of generality, states that pooled 
information is complete, i.e. there are no redundant states. An implication of this 
assumption is that for any E 1, ••• ' E 1, if Ei E IIi for all i and n;Ei * 0 then 
n;Ei is a singleton. To see this, suppose S1, S2 E nEi, Si* S2· Since Ei E IIi and 
each s ES lies in exactly one event in II;, this implies s2 E E;(s1) for all i, so 
that Si, s2 E E;(s1) for all i, contradicting Assumption 1. We also limit attention 
to SCS's which are closed under the common knowledge concatenation defined 
by II; this also entails no loss of generality (see Postlewaite and Schmeidler 
(1986)) and is defined as follows. Denote by II* the common knowledge 
partition defined by II. 
ASSUMPTION 2: For any Xi, x 2 E F, for any EE II*, if 
y(t)={x1(t) 
X2(t) 
then y E F. 
ift EE, 
if t ft E, 
Here, y is a common knowledge concatenation of x 1 and x 2 , and the 
assumption says that F is closed under such concatenations. 
This completes our description of the basic model, and we turn next to a 
description of mechanisms or the rules according to which trade takes place after 
agents receive their private information. A mechanism consists of a message 
space for each agent and an outcome function which maps the aggregate message 
space to the set of outcomes. A strategy for an agent is a decision rule which 
maps his private information into his message space. The concept of equilibrium 
is Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Formally: 
DEFINITION 1: A mechanism is a pair ( M, g ), M = M 1 X M 2 ••• x M 1, 
g: M ~A. If M; =II; for all i, then (M, g) is a direct mechanism. 
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DEFINITION 2: A strategy for agent i is CJ;: II;-+ M;. 
For any state s, we use the following notation: 
CJ(E(s))= {CJ1(E1(s)), ... ,CJ 1(E1(s))}; (J= {CJ1, .. . ,CJ 1 }; 
-i_ { 1 i-1 i+l /}. d CJ - CJ , ... ,CJ ,CJ , ... ,CJ ' an 
g(CJ) = {g(CJ(E(l))), ... , g(CJ(E(S)))}. 
DEFINITION 3: CJ is a (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium to (M, g) if, for all i and 
s, g(CJ)R;(E;(s))g(CJ-;, ii;) for all a;: II;-+ M;. 
DEFINITION 4: A mechanism (M, g) fully implements F if (i) for any x E F, 
there exists an equilibrium, CJ, with g( CJ) = x; (ii) if CJ is an equilibrium, then 
g(CJ) E F. 
Part (i) requires that every allocation rule in F is an equilibrium outcome of 
the mechanism, while (ii) requires that all equilibrium outcomes lie in F. 
If there exists a mechanism (M, g) which fully implements F, then Fis said to 
be implementable. In the next Section, we present a condition on SCS's, called 
Bayesian monotonicity, which is an extension of Maskin's (1977) notion of 
monotonicity. We also show that Bayesian monotonicity and an incentive compa-
tibility condition are necessary for implementation. In Section 4, we show that 
with at least three agents, Bayesian monotonicity and a slightly stronger incentive 
compatibility condition are sufficient for implementation. 
3. NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION: 
MONOTONICITY AND SELF-SELECTION 
A. Preliminary Definitions 
If an SCS is fully implemented by a mechanism, then all the equilibrium 
outcomes to that mechanism are elements of the SCS. We thus need to develop 
notation to keep track of all possible equilibrium strategies. For our purposes, a 
special type of strategy, called a deceptive strategy, turns out to be crucial to the 
analysis. To motivate what we mean by deceptive strategies, we begin by 
considering a direct mechanism, so Mi= II; for all i. Truth telling is simply the 
strategy CJ;(E;(s)) = E;(s) for all i and s. If all agents act truthfully, the 
intersection of their reported events at s is n;E;(s), which, by Assumption 1, is 
simply { s }. Next, we give the following definition. 
DEFINITION 5: A deception for i is a function a; : II; -+ II;. 
The set of all deceptions for i is equivalent to the set of all possible strategies 
available to i in a direct mechanism, where the truth-telling strategy is simply the 
identity deception. Suppose in a direct mechanism each i is using deception a;, so 
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that at s, each i reports a;(E;(s)) instead of E;(s). For each s, two possibilities 
arise: (a) n;ai(E;(s))* 0 and (b) n;a;(E;(s))= 0. In case (a), the discussion 
following Assumption 1 yields that the intersection is a singleton. Further, in this 
case, it is impossible to detect any inconsistency in the reports despite the 
deceptions. In case (b), the reports are clearly incompatible (though it may be 
impossible to infer which agent or group of agents is "causing" the incompatibil-
ity). In general, some group deceptions will lead to compatible reports and some 
will not. A major component of the implementation problem is to identify which 
group deceptions are consistent with equilibrium behavior. The problem is 
simplified by the fact that it is fairly easy to construct mechanisms to ensure that 
no equilibrium will involve incompatible deceptions. Formally, we have the 
following definition. 
DEFINITION 6: A group deception a = { a1, ... , a1 } is compatible with II if for 
all s,n;a;(Ei(s)) * 0. 
Assumption 1 yields n;a;(E;(s))* 0 if and only if it is a singleton, as 
discussed previously. Accordingly, for any a compatible with II, we define 
If state s occurs and all agents are using a compatible group deception a, then 
the intersection of their reported events is a(s ), and we say that the deceptive 
strategies agree on a(s) at s. 
LEMMA 1: For any a compatible with II, t E E;(s) = a(t) E E;(a(s)) for all i 
ands. 
PROOF: s' = a(s) = a;(E;(s)) = E;(s') for all i. For any i, t E E;(s) = E;(t) 
= E;(s), so a;(E;(t)) = E;(s'), which implies a(t) E E;(s'). Q.E.D. 
Consider next· the effect of a compatible group deception on allocations. 
Suppose a planner wishes to implement an allocation rule x, and designs a direct 
mechanism whose truthful equilibrium outcome is x. Then, at s, if each i reports 
E;(s), the intersection of the reported events is n;E;(s) = {s}, and the planner 
allocates x(s). Now suppose the agents are using a compatible group deception, 
a. Then, at s, the intersection of the reported events is a(s), and the planner 
inadvertently allocates x(a(s)) at s. Denote 
xa=(xa(l), ... ,xa(s)) where xa(t)=x(a(t)) forallt. 
Then, the allocation rule generated by the group deception is xa instead of x. 
More generally, consider an arbitrary mechanism (M, g) and let a be an 
equilibrium with g( a) = x. Corresponding to a deception a; for i, we can define a 
deceptive strategy for i relative to a; by a~(E;(s)) = a;(a;(E;(s))). If each i uses 
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a;, and a is compatible with II, we get g( aa) = xa. The reason this is important 
for implementation is that if, regardless of the mechanism we use, a,, is an 
equilibrium whenever a is, then x,, must lie in F whenever x lies in Fin order 
for F to be implementable. This is essentially the content of our Bayesian 
monotonicity condition, to which we now turn. 
B. Bayesian Monotonicity 
To help motivate and explain the intuition behind the concept of Bayesian 
monotonicity, we begin with complete information, where E;(s) = {s} and 
q;(slE;(s)) = 1 for all i ands. For this case, Maskin (1977) identified a necessary 
condition called monotonicity. The following two alternative formulations of this 
condition are particularly helpful in illustrating how Bayesian monotonicity 
emerges as a natural extension of Maskin's condition. 
For the first representation of monotonicity with complete information, we 
write a social choice set as a multivalued mapping (correspondence) F: S 4 A 
rather than as a collection of single valued mappings. The greater generality of 
the latter representation (used everywhere else in this paper) is important for the 
case of incomplete information, but is superfluous when there is complete 
information. This follows from the fact that with complete information, the 
common knowledge partition defined by II consists of singleton events E*(s) = 
{ s}. Assumption 2 then yields that every selection from F is an element of F, so 
F can be written as a correspondence from S into A. Let R;(s) denote i's ex post 
preference relation in state s. 
DEFINITION 7: ( s, s ', a) E S X S X A satisfies the monotonicity hypothesis if, 
for all i, for all b EA, aR;(s)b ~ aR;(s')b. 
In other words, the monotonicity hypothesis holds for outcome a with respect 
to states s and s' if, for every agent, the lower contour set of a at s is contained 
in that agent's lower contour set of a at s'. Observe that it is usually not the case 
that both (s, s', a) and (s', s, a) satisfy the monotonicity hypothesis. 
DEFINITION 8: F is monotonic if, for all (s, s', a) such that a E F(s), if 
(s, s', a) satisfies the monotonicity hypothesis then a E F(s'). 
While this is a very useful and simple representation of monotonicity with 
complete information a slightly different formulation will better serve the pur-
pose of motivating the much more difficult Bayesian monotonicity condition 
needed with incomplete information. Since E ;( s) = { s } for all i and s, we have 
a;: S --+ S for each i. Consequently, the only types of compatible deceptions 
which are relevant with complete information are "unanimous" deceptions in 
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which for some s', ai(s') = aj(s') = s for all i, j. Using this alternative represen-
tation, we get the following definition: 
DEFINITION 9: (a, x) satisfies the monotonicity hypothesis if, for all i, for alls', 
for all y EX, xRi(a(s'))y = x,,Ri(s')y,,. 
To see that the two formulations are equivalent, recall that with complete 
information, xRi(a(s')) y if and only if Ui(xi(a(s')),a(s')) ~ Ui(yi(a(s')), 
a(s')) while x,,Ri(s') y,, if and only if Ui(x(a(s')),s') ~ Ui(yi(a(s')),s'). 
Lettings= a(s'), the equivalence is immediate. Now we can write the following 
definition: 
DEFINITION 10: F is monotonic if, for all a compatible with II and all x E F, 
if (a, x) satisfies the monotonicity hypothesis (Definition 9) then x,, E F. 
We can now show how the second formulation of monotonicity extends to the 
case of incomplete information. One modification is required to deal with a new 
possibility which could not arise with complete information. With complete 
information, if a is compatible with II, then ai is uniquely determined by a-i. 
This is not true with incomplete information except in the more special case dealt 
with by Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), in which every group of I - 1 players 
collectively has complete information. For that special case, Definition 10 applies 
directly if we simply replace the ex-post preference relation, Ri(s), by its interim 
version, Ri(Ei(s)). 
For the general case, the monotonicity hypothesis must be modified to account 
for the possibility that some information is held exclusively by some agent. This 
we do as follows. 
Define E-i(s) = n j,.iEj(s). For any y EX and for any Ei E IIi, define 
if E-i(t)nE; =F 0, 
otherwise. 
In other words, YE' corresponds toy,,, where aj is the identity for all j =Fi and 
a; is the "constant deception," Ei, with the added proviso that y,,(0) = 0. Given 
a compatible with II, we let E;;;(s)=nj,.;aj(Ej(s)) and make the following 
definition: 
DEFINITION 11: (a, x) satisfies the Bayesian monotonicity hypothesis if, for all 
i, for all s', for all y: S--+ A, 
DEFINITION 12: Fis Bayesian monotonic if, for all a compatible with II and 
all x E F, if (a, x) satisfies the Bayesian monotonicity hypothesis then x.,, E F. 
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The proof that Bayesian monotonicity is necessary for full implementation in 
Bayesian equilibrium is now immediate. 
THEOREM 1: If Fis implementable then Fis Bayesian monotonic. 
PROOF: Let (M, g) implement F, let a be an equilibrium with g(a) = x E F, 
and suppose the Bayesian monotonicity hypothesis is satisfied by (a:, x) for some 
a compatible with II. We argue that aa defined by a~(Ei(s)) = ai(ai(Ei(s)) for 
all s is also an equilibrium. Suppose aa is not an equilibrium. Then, there exists 
i,s', and mi E Mi with g(aa-i,m')Pi(Ei(s')) g(aa). Let iii be the constant 
strategy iii(Ei(t))=mi for all t. Let y=g(a-i,iii), so Ya=g(a;i,iii) and 
Ya Pi(Ei(s')) xa by construction. The hypothesis yields s E E;;i(s') with 
YE'.(a(s'))Pi(Ei(s)) x. Since iii is constant, we have YE'(a(s'))(t) = y(t) if E-i(t) n 
E'(a(s'))-:/= 0 and YE'(a(s'))(t) = 0 ~y(t) otherwise. This implies y ;:;:yE'(a(s'))· 
Therefore yRi(Ei(s))YE'(a(s')) so yPi(Ei(s))x. This contradicts a being an 
equilibrium, and we conclude that aa is an equilibrium, in which case xa is an 
equilibrium outcome. Since Fis implementable, we have xa E F, as required by 
Bayesian monotonicity. Q.E.D. 
The above proof simplifies somewhat if information is such that every a is 
compatible. For example, consider the most commonly used class of models in 
which a state is a vector of types, s.= (s1, ... , s 1 ), and each agent knows his own 
type but receives no precise information about the types of others. If Si denotes 
the set of types for agent i, we get Ei(s) = { si} X s-i. With such diffuse 
information structures, every a is compatible with II, and the proof of Theorem 
1 simplifies because in the above construction YE'(a(s')) reduces to y. 
C. Incentive Compatibility 
It is clear that besides Bayesian monotonicity, implementability will also 
require some type of incentive compatibility condition, since (i) of Definition 4 
requires every x E F to be an equilibrium outcome to the mechanism. The 
literature on Bayesian incentive compatibility (e.g. Myerson (1979) or Harris and 
Townsend (1981)) yields the result that x is an equilibrium outcome to some 
mechanism if and only if x satisfies certain incentive compatibility conditions. 
The version of incentive compatibility required for our purposes is the following. 
DEFINITION 13: F satisfies Incentive Compatibility (IC) if, for all x E F, for all 
i, for all s, for all Ei E II;, 
It is straightforward to show that if x is an equilibrium outcome to some 
mechanism, then x satisfies IC. Formally, we have the following theorem. 
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THEOREM 2: If Fis implementable, F satisfies IC. 
PROOF: Let x E F. Part (i) of Definition 4 requires that x be an equilibrium 
outcome. By the Revelation Principle, there is a direct mechanism to which truth 
is an equilibrium and x is the truthful equilibrium outcome. Let h denote the 
allocation rule in this direct mechanism. Consider the alternative direct mecha-
nism g with 
g(E1, ••• ,E1 )=0 otherwise. 
Then, truth continues to be an equilibrium to g, and x remains the truthful 
equilibrium outcome. Since for any i and £i E II;, xE' is the outcome of the 
game when all agents except i tell the truth, and i reports Ei, we must have 
x Ri(Ei(s)) xE; for all i, which is precisely the inequality in IC. Q.E.D. 
Again, as in Theorem 1, the proof for diffuse information structures is very 
simple since the definition of incentive compatibility reduces to the "self-selec-
tion" condition of Harris and Townsend (1981) and the Bayesian incentive 
compatibility condition of Myerson (1979). 
4. SUFFICIENCY 
The previous Section identified two intuitive conditions which are necessary for 
a set of allocation rules to be fully implementable in Bayesian equilibrium. In this 
Section, we show that when there are at least three agents, essentially the same 
conditions are sufficient for implementation. For reasons made clear below, our 
proof of sufficiency uses the following modified incentive compatibility condition. 
For any e EA such that e * 0, let 
ifE-i(t)nE;* 0, 
otherwise. 
DEFINITION 14: F satisfies e-Incentive Compatibility (e-IC) if for all x E F, for 
all i, for all s, for all Ei E rri, 
This condition, which is a slight strengthening of IC, is equivalent to IC in a 
large class of models. For example, this constraint reduces to IC whenever 
information is diffuse. 
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THEOREM 3: If I~ 3, and Fis Bayesian monotonic and e-IC for some e > 0, 
then F is implementable. 
PROOF: We construct a mechanism to implement F. Note first that if F 
satisfies e-IC, then F satisfies e'-IC for all e' < e. Thus without loss of generality, 
we can assume that F satisfies e-JC where e < w/l. Let 
Mi=II;xxx {0,1,2,3, ... }, 
and 
M=MiXM 2 X ... XM 1• 
We define g separately for different subsets of M. Let 
D1 = { mjm; = (Ei, x, ni) "iii; x E F; 0 =F (')E; = {S}; 
l 
n; =F 1 "iii; n; =0 for at least I - 1 agents}, 
D2 (i)={mjml=(Ei,x,O)"ilj=Fi;xeF;mi=(Ei,y,1); Q.Ei=F 0}, 
J-rl 
D2 = UD2(i), 
i 
D3(i)={mjml=(Ei,x,O)"ilj=Fi;xeF; Q.Ei=F 0;m$.D1 UD2}, 
J-r I 
D3 = UD3{i), 
i 
D4 = {mjm$.D1 UD2UD3}. 
We further subdivide D2(i) as follows: 
Da(i) = { m ED2 (i)j 0 =F nE1 = {S}; xRi(Ei(s))YE' "ilsE Q.Ei}, 
J J-rl 
Db(i) = { m E D2(i)j 0 =F (')E 1 = {S}; 
J 
YE;pi(Ei(s))x for some s E Q Ei }, 
J-rl 
DAi) = { m ED2 (i)l(')Ei= 0 }· 
J 
Note that if Da(i) U Db(i) U DcCi) = Di(i), and for j =Fi, D2(i) n D2(j) = 0. 
We subdivide D3 as follows: 
D31 = { m E D3 jm~ = 0 for all i or there exist j, k with m~ =F mn, 
D32 = { m E D3 jm~ > 1 for some i and m~ = m~ for all j, k}. 
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Note that if m~ = 1, the aggregate message is in D2(i). Finally, let 
k =max { m~li= 1,2, .. . , I}, K= {ilm~ = k }, k= #K. 
We define g: M--+ A as follows: 
g(m)=x(s), ifmED1 , 
g(m) = y(s), if m E DAi) for some i, 
g(m) = 0, if m E Db(i) for some i, 
g(m) =0, if mEDc(i) for some i, 
g(m) =0, if mED31 , 
g;(m) = e, 
gi(m)=O, 
.( ) {w/k, g' m = 0, 
if m E D32 and m~ > 1, 
if m E D32 and m ~ = 0, 
if m E D 4 and i E K, 
if m E D4 and i $. K. 
Note that g is 'wasteful', in that it appropriates resources in D3 and in D2 • 
Explanation of the Mechanism 
The message space is divided into four basic regions, DcD4 • D1 is a region of 
agreement: the reports of agents agree on a state, s, all agents request the same 
allocation rule, x (in F), and at most one agent reports a positive integer. In this 
region, the outcome is x(s). In D2(i), agent i deviates unilaterally from D1 by 
reporting a "l" and asking for some y EX. In this region, the outcome depends 
on whether the message lies in D0 (i), Db(i), or Dii). In D0 (i), i appears no 
better off with y than with x at all states collectively reported by j * i and in this 
case, the outcome is y(S), where the reported events of all agents agree on s. In 
Db(i), i is better off with y than with x at some state collectively reported by the 
other agents, while in Dc(i), there is a disagreement about the state. In both 
Db(i) and Dc(i), all resources are appropriated. D3 is divided into two subre-
gions. In D31, either all agents submit zero or some agent requests y * x but fails 
to submit a "l". In D32 , exactly one agent submits a positive integer greater than 
one and all agents request the same allocation rule. From the definition of D3, 
this is an exhaustive partition of D3• In D31, all rl!sources are appropriated, while 
in D32 the agent submitting a positive integer gets e while all other resources are 
appropriated. This outcome function prevents any equilibrium in D31 : by report-
ing an integer greater than one, some agent can move from D31 to either D32 or 
D4 and be better off. Finally, D4 is a region of multilateral deviations from D1; 
here, the agent reporting the highest integer receives all the resources. Since any 
j i= i can move unilaterally from D2(i) and D32 to D4 , there is no equilibrium in 
any of these regions. There is clearly no equilibrium in D4• Thus, all equilibria lie 
in D1• 
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The above intuition is formalized in three lemmas which together constitute a 
proof of Theorem 3. Proofs are in the Appendix. The first lemma establishes that 
no equilibrium message lies outside of D1 and that no positive integer is used. 
LEMMA 2: If a is an equilibrium to (M, g), then a(E(s)) E D1 for alls and 
a~(E;(s)) = 0 for all i ands. 
The next lemma shows that any strategy profile in which every agent truthfully 
reports his event, requests the same element of F, and submits the integer 0, is an 
equilibrium. This establishes that the mechanism (weakly) implements F. That is, 
condition (i) of the definition of implementation is satisfied: 
For any x E F, there exists an equilibrium to (M, g) such that g(a) = x. 
LEMMA 3: For any x E F, a;(E;(s)) = (E;(s), x ,O) for all i and for alls is an 
equilibrium. 
Finally, the last lemma establishes that (M, g) fully implements F. 
LEMMA 4: If a is an equilibrium to (m , g), then g(a) E F. 
A few remarks about the proof of Theorem 3 are in order. First, the mecha-
nism we construct to implement an SCS is related to the standard Maskin-type 
mechanism (Maskin (1977), Williams (1984), Saijo (1988), McKelvey (1985)), but 
differs in some important ways. One similarity is that all players are asked to 
reveal what they know about others as well as what they know about themselves 
(since reporting an event is like reporting a subset of possible preference 
profiles). In fact the rest of the message space, an allocation rule and an integer, 
also parallels the mechanisms used to implement SCS's with complete informa-
tion. It differs from the complete information mechanisms in two ways. First 
everyone is severely punished in D3• The reason for this is that for some 
disagreement messages the planner may be unable to detect who is "causing" the 
disagreement. That is, a unilateral departure from a compatible joint strategy can 
be made anonymously. This is illustrated by a four-state example. Let II1 = 
{{1,2),(3,4)}, II2 = {{1,3),(2,4)}, II3 = {(1,4),(2,3)}. Suppose a1 and a 2 are 
identity maps, and a 3{(2,3)} = (1,4), a 3{(1,4)} = (2,3). When state 1 occurs, 1 
and 2 report (1, 2) and (1, 3) respectively, while 3 reports (2, 3). Then, the 
intersection of the reports of any I - 1 group is nonempty, while the overall 
intersection is empty. In this case, it is impossible to detect the deviator. In fact, 
most of the apparent complexity of our mechanism can be attributed to this type 
of problem, arising because of possible incompatibilities in deceptive strategies. 
Most of these complications disappear if the information structure falls in one of 
two classes : (i) complete information, when all unilateral deceptions are incom-
patible, and (ii) diffuse information structures, in which all deceptions are 
compatible. In the (more interesting) second case, the mechanism and proof 
become much simpler since in this case the region D3 can be combined with D1 
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while Dc(i) is empty for all i. The reason for this is that regions D3 and Dc(i) 
only come into play when there are incompatible reports, but if information is 
diffuse, all reports are compatible. The elimination of these two regions removes 
the need to use collective punishments, and so permits nonwasteful implementa-
tion. 
Second, each player requests a state-contingent allocation rather than a single 
noncontingent allocation, as in the complete information case. The reason this is 
needed is very simple. Since players make their decisions at an interim stage, they 
are concerned with possible allocations in more than one state (i.e., all states 
belonging to the event they observe). Therefore, the agents will have to be 
required to request allocations which are contingent on at least all those states in 
the relevant common knowledge event. Of course, this reduces to a single state 
under complete information. 
The e-qualification of incentive compatibility, weak as it is, is stronger than 
what is needed in our constructive proof. The role of this qualification is to rule 
out equilibria in D31• In our mechanism, an arbitrarily small incentive (e) is 
available to ensure that some agent, say j, has an incentive to move the aggregate 
message from D31 to D32• In turn, e-IC is then required in the proof of Lemma 3 
to remove an incentive for that agent to move the aggregate message from D1 to 
D32 • All that is needed for this argument to work is that in each state, e-IC hold 
for at least one player, and IC hold for everyone else. However, as we pointed 
out above, e-IC reduces to IC in most cases of interest. 
Finally, we comment on the role of three or more agents. The reason we 
assume I~ 3 is the same as the reason it is usually assumed in the case of 
complete information and has to do with the particular construction used in the 
proof. It is used in Lemma 2 to ensure that if the aggregate message lies in D3(i) 
for all i, then there is at least one !igent who can profitably deviate by reporting a 
large integer. In our construction, this is not always possible if I= 2. 
5. IDENTIFYING IMPLEMENTABLE ALLOCATIONS: SOME EXAMPLES 
In this Section, we provide examples of SCS's which are and are not implemen-
table and relate our findings to the literature on implementation with complete 
information. In studies of implementation via Nash equilibrium in complete 
information economies, a central result relates implementable SCS's to Walrasian 
equilibrium allocations. It is well known (Hurwicz (1979), Schmeidler (1980), 
Hurwicz, Maskin, and Postlewaite (1984)) that the SCS which associates the set 
of (constrained) W alrasian allocations to each state is implementable. In econo-
mies with incomplete information, one might hope that a similar result holds. 
However, a problem arises concerning what sort of "similar" result to look for. 
Specifically, one must ask what is the appropriate extension of Walrasian 
allocations to economies with incomplete information. Two possibilities im-
mediately come to mind: (1) Arrow-Debreu complete contingent claims allo-
cations, and (2) rational expectations equilibria in which a trader's informational 
constraints are assumed to be relaxed by public price information. 
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In considering the first of these, it is worth noting that the Arrow-Debreu 
allocations are ex-ante Pareto optimal since insurance is made possible by 
trading across states. However, the implicit timing of the resolution of uncer-
tainty in the Arrow-Debreu model is different from the timing in our framework. 
In our model, trades are made after agents receive their private information. 
Consequently, in our model, Arrow-Debreu allocations may well fail to be 
individually rational. 
Rational expectations equilibrium allocation rules correspond much more 
closely to the timing structure we use. The main difference between our model 
and rational expectations equilibrium models is that in the course of playing out 
a mechanism, we do not assume that an agent's information is augmented by any 
aggregate statistic of other traders' messages (such as a price). Rather, each agent 
plays the game knowing only which event he has observed. 
EXAMPLE 1: (Arrow-Debreu allocation rules are not always implementable): 
There are two informed agents, one good and two states. The parameters are: 
w1 =(3,3), w2 = (2, 2), U1(x1, s) = s · log(x1), s = 1, 2, U 2(x 2, s) = log(x 2), q1 = 
q 2 = (.5, .5). Then, the unique equilibrium state prices from trading in a complete 
contingent claims market are (1, 3 /2) and the equilibrium allocation rule is given 
by: 
Agent 1 
Agent 2 
State 1 
5/2 
5/2 
State 2 
10/3 
5/3 
Let F be the SCS whose values are given in the above table. We will show that F 
does not satisfy Bayesian monotonicity. Consider a= ( a1, a 2 ) with a;(t) = {1} 
for both i and for both t. Then, a is compatible with II since both agents are 
perfectly informed, and a(t) = {l} for all t. Since both agents are perfectly 
informed and utility is increasing, the Bayesian monotonicity hypothesis is 
trivially satisfied. For example, for s' = 2, the condition for agent 1 reads 
U1(x1(1), 1);;:: U1(y1(1), 1) implies U1(x1(1),2);;:: U1(y1{1),2). Bayesian mono-
tonicity then requires that (x(l),x{l)) must lie in F. However, (x(l),x(l)) is not 
an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Since Bayesian monotonicity is necessary for 
implementation, this implies that the Arrow-Debreu complete contingent claims 
equilibrium is not implementable. 
The reason why F fails to satisfy Bayesian monotonicity is intuitively clear. 
The Arrow-Debreu allocation rules are ex-ante allocation rules, and thus provide 
insurance, while the structure of the game analyzed in the previous Sections 
requires trades to be made after agents receive their private information. Once all 
agents are perfectly informed, there is no practical possibility for insurance. Not 
surprisingly, then, this allocation rule can fail to be implementable. 
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While the intuition behind this example is straightforward, it is interesting to 
examine the consequences of adding an uninformed agent to the above economy. 
In the next example, we add such an agent, and specify his preferences and 
endowments so that this agent does not change the equilibrium allocations of 
agents 1 and 2. Somewhat surprisingly, the allocation rule now becomes imple-
mentable. 
EXAMPLE 2 (Adding an uninformed agent makes the allocation rule imple-
mentable): Consider the above example with the addition of a completely 
uninformed agent, say agent 3, with II3 = {1, 2}, w3 =(1,1), and U3(x 3, s) = 
(s + l)log(x 3 ). With these parameters, the Arrow-Debreu SCS is given by: 
Agent 1 
Agent 2 
Agent 3 
State 1 
5/2 
5/2 
1 
State 2 
10/3 
5/3 
1 
Here, the uninformed agent receives his initial endowment at the equilibrium. 
Thus, agent 3 adds "nothing" to the economy in any real or informational sense. 
Nonetheless, we now show that with the addition of the uninformed agent, the 
SCS satisfies Bayesian monotonicity. Consider a1 and a 2 as in Example 1. a 3 is 
constrained to be the identity since agent 3 is uninformed. As above, the 
Bayesian monotonicity hypothesis is trivially satisfied for agents 1 and 2, so 
consider the hypothesis for agent 3 with E 3 = {1,2}: 
(a) q 3(1)U3{x 3(1), 1) + q3(2)U 3{x 3(2),2) 
~ q3(1)U 3{ y 3(1), 1) + q3(2)U3{ y 3(2), 2) 
implies 
(b) q 3(1)U 3{x 3(1), 1) + q3(2)U3{x3(1),2) 
~ q 3(l)U3{y3(1), 1) + q 3(2) U3{y3(1), 2). 
If we pick y 3(1) = 2, y 3(2) = .02, then (a) is satisfied while (b) is not. For this a, 
then, Bayesian monotonicity does not restrict F. A similar argument applies to 
the a in which both informed agents always agree to 2. For the a in which 
a;{(l)} = (2), a;{(2)} = (1), i = 1,2, let y 3(1) = 1.5, y 3(2) = .75, and again, the 
first inequality is satisfied but the second is not. Therefore Bayesian monotonicity 
is satisfied. Further, it is straightforward to check that there exists an e such that 
e-IC is satisfied. For example, for agent 1 at s = 1, it reduces to U1(x(l), 1);;:::; 
U1(x(l),1) if E 1 = {l} and U1(x(l),1)~ U1(e,1) if E 1 = {2}. Similar inequali-
ties follow at s = 2 and for agent 2. Since x is strictly positive, there exists an e so 
that e-IC is satisfied for both agents 1and2. For agent 3, E 3(s) = {1,2} for all 
s, so the condition reduces to xR;(E;(s))x for all s. Since I= 3, this allocation 
rule is implementable. In fact, using the mechanism in the proof of Theorem 3, it 
is easily seen that the strategy described in Lemma 3 is the only equilibrium. 
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The intuition behind this example is quite straightforward. Consider the a 
which led to a violation of Bayesian monotonicity in Example 1, in which both 
informed agents always report state 1. In our mechanism, agent 3 can simply 
report y = (2, 0.02) and get 2 in either state. Thus, (x(l), x(l)) is no longer an 
equilibrium outcome in this example while it was one in Example 1. From this it 
is also clear that any direct mechanism to which x is an equilibrium outcome in 
Example 1 will also have (x(l), x(l)) as an equilibrium outcome, since in this 
case, agent 3 cannot affect the outcome. 
The rational expectations equilibrium SCS (see, for example, Radner (1979)) in 
the above examples consists of the initial endowments since there is only one 
good, and is (trivially) implementable. More generally, if individual endowments 
are state independent and all rational expectations equilibrium allocations are 
strictly interior, then the rational expectations equilibrium SCS is implementable 
when there are at least three agents and every group of I - 1 agents collectively 
has complete information. This is shown in Palfrey and Srivastava (1987), where 
it is also shown that neither state independence of endowments nor interiority 
can generally be relaxed. Furthermore, rational expectations equilibrium allo-
cation rules generally are not incentive compatible (Blume and Easley (1985)), 
and therefore they will not satisfy e-IC. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper characterized implementable SCS's in pure exchange economic 
environments with no aggregate endowment uncertainty when individuals have 
asymmetric incomplete information about the state. An incentive compatibility 
condition is required for well-known reasons relating to the revelation principle. 
A monotonocity condition is required for the same reasons it is required with 
complete information. This demonstrates that the characterization of (Nash) fully 
implementable allocations with complete information extends in a very natural 
way to incomplete information. 
Despite this apparent similarity between complete and incomplete information, 
we show via some examples in Section 5 that some of the "intuitive" interpreta-
tions of implementable allocations with complete information do not extend in 
an obvious way to incomplete information. In particular, we provide some 
examples in which SCS's with incomplete information are not implementable. 
One extension not addressed in the paper is the implementation problem in 
more general environments than the pure exchange setting examined here. While 
we present no results here, a few comments can be made. First, for sufficiency we 
will certainly need a no veto power condition, appropriately modified to account 
for incomplete information. Such a condition requires that an outcome be 
included in the SCS if it is nearly unanimously (except for possibly 1 person) 
viewed as the best outcome. Second, our construction depends upon our ability 
to identify an outcome which is unanimously bad for all individuals in all states 
(the 0 allocation). It appears that in the general case some condition relating to a 
worst outcome may be required unless information is diffuse. On the other hand, 
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extending the necessity results to more general environments is simpler. If 
information is diffuse, the necessity arguments of both Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 
apply directly, since incompatible reports do not occur so reliance on "worst" 
outcomes and collective punishments is removed. If information is not diffuse, 
then the monotonicity condition (and JC) will have to be modified because a 
collective punishment may not be available. A complete characterization of fully 
implementable allocation rules under incomplete information in general (noneco-
nomic) environments remains an open question. 
Finally, we remark on the specification of a state. In our model, in Postlewaite 
and Schmeidler (1986), and implicitly in the literature on implementation with 
complete information, the information structure is not a part of the description 
of a state, but is known to the planner. This is assumed implicitly in our proof of 
sufficiency since a part of the message space of an agent is his partition. It would 
appear fruitful to extend the analysis to the case where the partitions are also 
private information but in a sense such an extension would only be definitional. 
It can be done by treating the information structure as a part of the specification 
of a state, in which case an SCS would map the set of possible partitions and 
preferences into allocations. We also assumed throughout the analysis that there 
was no private information about endowments (see Postlewaite (1979)), and 
relaxing this assumption would also appear to be a fruitful direction to pursue. 
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APPENDIX 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: We first show that 11((E(s)) e D1, for alls. Suppose not. Then, there are four 
cases to consider: (1) 11(E(s)) e D2(i) for some i, s; (2) 11(E(s)) e D32 for some s; (3) 11(E(s)) e D:i1 
for some s; (4) 11(E(s)) e D4 for some s. 
CASE 1: In this case, there exists an i and ans such that 11(E(s)) e D2(i). Since/~ 3, there exists 
j .Pi who observes Ej(s) and who does not receive iii under g at s. For this j, define 
u/( Ej(t)) = 11/( Ej(t)), all t, 
u{( Ej(t)) = 11{( Ej(t)), all t, 
u/(Ej(s)) =2+max{ a.ik(Ek(t))ik=l,2, ... ,1; teS}, 
u/( Ej(t)) = 11/( Ej(t)) for all t ~ Ej(s ). 
Under aj, j reports the same events and requests the same allocation rule as before, but at Ej(s), he 
reports a number which is not equal to one and is guaranteed to be larger than that reported by any 
other agent. 
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CLAIM: By using iij, agent j is strictly better off when he observes Ei(s). To see this, define 
ii- ( o-j, iij), and consider any t e Ej(s). There are five subcases to consider: 
(i) If o(E(t)) e D1 , then either ii(E(t)) e DI> in which case j is just as well off as under oj, or 
ii(E(t)) e D4 , in which case j receives iii, and is at least as well off. 
(ii) If o(E(t)) e D2(k) for some k, then ii(E(t)) e D4 , j gets iii and is at least as well off. Note 
that since o(E(s)) e D2 (i), it cannot be the case that o(E(t)) e D2 (j). Ats, when k = i, j is strictly 
better off. 
(iii) If o(E(t)) e D31 , then gi(o(E(t)) = 0 so j cannot possibly be worse off. 
(iv) If o(E(t)) e D32 and j is not reporting a positive integer under o, then ii(E(t)) e D4 , j gets 
iii and is strictly better off. If o(E(t)) e D32 and j is reporting a positive integer, then ii(E(t)) e D32 
and there is no change. 
(v) If o(E(t)) e D4 , then ii(E(t)) e D4 , j gets iii, and is at least as well off. 
In each subcase, therefore, j is either strictly better off or at least as well off, and at s he is strictly 
better off. This completes the proof of the claim that if, for some s, o(E(s)) e D2(i), then o cannot 
be an equilibrium. 
In case 2, there exists ans such that o(E(s)) e D3(i) and a j such that o(E(s)) ~ D:J(j). In this 
case, we can define iij exactly as above and can show that j is strictly better off using iij. 
In case 3, we define iij in the same way as in case 1 using some j for whom o(E(s)) e D3(j). 
Then, at s, j moves the aggregate message from D31 to D32 and gets e instead of 0, in which case j is 
strictly better off. It is again straightforward to show that j is at least as well off at all t e E 1 ( s ). In 
case 4, defining iij in the same way for some j who does not get iii at s yields that j is strictly better 
off using iij, so that o could not have been an equilibrium. 
We next show that no positive integers are used. From above, o(E(s)) e D1 for all s. If 
o3 (E(s)) * 0 for s, then define ifl(Ei(s)) as above for some j who does not get iii at s. Then, 
following the same argument as before, it can be shown that j is strictly better off using iij instead of 
oj, so o cannot be an equilibrium. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3: Suppose I - 1 agents are using the above strategy. Consider agent i . If, at s, i 
submits the message (E;(s), x,O), then the outcome at t e E;(s) is x(t). Suppose instead that i uses 
(E;, y, n) * (E1(s), x,O) at s. There are several cases to consider: 
(i) n * 1, y - x: In this case, me D1 if E- 1(t) n E; * 0 and m lies in D:i2 or D31 if E- 1(t) n E; 
= 0, so at best, i receives x£ .. From e- IC, xR1(E1(s))x£., so (E;(s), x,O) does at least as well as 
(E1, y, n). 
(ii) n * 1, y * x: In this case, me D31 for all t e E1(s ), i gets 0 at all t e E;(s ), so that 
submitting (E1(s), x,O) does at least as well for i. 
(iii) n = 1: In this case, me D2(i) for all t e E;(s). Let 
T. = { t e E;(s )Im e D.(i)}, 
Tb= { t E E1(s)lm E Db(i) U Dc(i)}. 
Let z(t) be the outcome at t. Then, z(t) = YE•(t) if t e T. and z(t) = 0 if t e Tb. Since preferences 
are increasing, .YE'R;(E1(s))z. Since all j * i are reporting Ej(s), sen j+,Ej, and me D0 (i) 
requires xR'(E'(s))YE" Thus, xR'(E'(s))z, and (E'(s), x,O) does at least as well as (E', y, n). 
Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 4: Let 0 be any equilibrium to (M, g). Then, by Lemma 2, o(E(s)) E D1 for all 
s. Since F is closed under the common knowledge concatenation defined by II (Assumption 2), we 
get o4(E1(s))=xEF for all i ands. Define a'(E1(s))=o/(E'(s)), i=l,2, .. .,l. Then, a is 
compatible with II, and the equilibrium outcome is x"'. We have to show that x"' e F. 
Suppose not. Then Bayesian monotonicity yields i,s',y such that xR1(E'(s))YE'(a(s')) for all 
s e E;;'(s') but YaP'(E'(s'))x"' . Then, using 0 1 when i observes E'(s') is not a best response for i; 
if, at E 1(s'), he reports (a1(E1(s')), y,l), he moves from D1 to D.(i), the outcome is Ya instead of 
x"', and i is strictly better off. This is true no matter which state in E1(s') has occurred since by 
Lemma 1, a(T) e E1(a(s')) for all Te E1(s') . This contradicts o being an equilibrium, and so we get 
x"' E F. This completes the proof. Q.E.D. 
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